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1 Introduction
Trade costs are a staple ingredient in today’s trade literature. Broadly defined, trade costs include
any cost of engaging in international trade such as transportation costs, tariﬀs, non-tariﬀ barriers,
informational costs, time costs, diﬀerent product standards, exchange rate costs and local distribution
costs, among others. They feature prominently in the vast majority of theoretical papers, including
the models of Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Melitz (2003). In addition, a growing empirical literature,
surveyed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), is devoted to exploring the sources and size of trade
costs. A deeper understanding of the causes of trade costs is of particular importance because it would
enable a better evaluation of their welfare implications. These are suspected to be large: on their
own, policy-related trade costs may be worth more than ten percent of national income (Anderson
and van Wincoop, 2002).
A major challenge faced by empirical researchers is to measure overall trade costs since “direct
measures are remarkably sparse and inaccurate” (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004, p.692). Direct
measures are only available for a few components, for instance transportation and insurance costs,
usually proxied by the ratio of c.i.f. and f.o.b. trade values (Harrigan, 1993, Hummels, 2001a, 2007),1
policy barriers such as specific tariﬀ or non-tariﬀ barriers (Chen, 2004, Harrigan, 1993, Head and
Mayer, 2000), informational costs (Rauch, 1999) or time costs (Evans and Harrigan, 2005, Harrigan,
2005, Hummels, 2001b). But even for those components, data coverage is often limited to a few
countries and years, and it can be hard to gather disaggregated trade cost data at the industry or
product level.
Given those diﬃculties in obtaining accurate measures of trade costs, some researchers indirectly
infer the level of trade impediments from trade flows. This approach has the obvious advantage of
extending the analysis to more countries, years and more finely disaggregated data. One way of doing
this is to compute trade to output ratios (Harrigan, 1996); another is to estimate “border eﬀects,”
which mostly reflect the extent of border-related costs.2
This paper is part of the research eﬀort that attempts to indirectly infer trade impediments from
trade flows. The first contribution of the paper is to develop a micro-founded measure of bilateral
trade integration that can be applied to disaggregated panel data. We derive this measure by modeling
disaggregated trade flows at the industry level in the gravity framework pioneered by Anderson and
van Wincoop (2003, 2004), allowing trade costs and substitution elasticities to be heterogeneous
across industries. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) show that trade flows are determined not only
by bilateral trade costs between two countries but also by average trade barriers with other countries,
which they refer to as “multilateral resistance.” Following the approach of Novy (2008), we derive
an analytical solution for multilateral resistance variables that vary across industries and over time.
In turn, this enables us to derive a micro-founded measure of bilateral trade integration that has an
in-built control for time-varying multilateral resistance and can therefore be applied to panel data.
1Moreover, Limão and Venables (2001) use the quotes from shipping firms for a standard container shipped from
Baltimore to several destinations. Combes and Lafourcade (2005) develop a new methodology to compute transportation
costs and apply it to road transport by truck in France.
2Examples include Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud
(2003), Chen (2004), Eaton and Kortum (2002), Evans (2003), Head and Mayer (2000), Head and Ries (2001), McCallum
(1995), Nitsch (2000) and Wei (1996).
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Arguably, the Anderson and van Wincoop model is one of the most parsimonious trade models
of recent years. It rests on the Armington assumption that countries produce diﬀerentiated goods
and trade is driven by consumers’ love of variety, leading to the key gravity equation. However, we
show that isomorphic trade integration measures can be derived from the Ricardian trade model by
Eaton and Kortum (2002), from Chaney’s (2008) extension of the Melitz (2003) heterogeneous firms
model as well as from the heterogeneous firms model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) with linear
non-CES demand. This is possible because all these models lead to gravity equations that have a
similar structure. Our trade integration measure is therefore consistent with a broad range of the
recent theoretical trade literature and is not limited to any one particular framework.
Although we regard our approach as complementary to other research that indirectly infers trade
impediments from trade flows, we discuss how our trade integration measure diﬀers from ad hoc
proxies commonly used in the literature such as trade to output ratios. In particular, we show that ad
hoc proxies without micro-foundations can erroneously pick up changes in multilateral trade barriers
as changes in bilateral trade barriers. We are instead able to focus on bilateral trade integration
because our micro-founded measure is not distorted by multilateral resistance eﬀects.
The second contribution of the paper is to bring our measure of trade integration to the data.
This enables us to document and explain the variation of trade barriers across 166 manufacturing
industries in 11 European Union countries over the period 1999-2003. The case of the European
Union is appealing since trade integration is expected to be strong between its member states due to
two factors. First, these countries have succeeded in dismantling many restrictions on trade, including
tariﬀs and quotas that were completely eliminated by 1968. Second, the situation has been further
reinforced by the implementation of the Single Market Programme (SMP), launched in the mid-1980s.
Consistent with the standard gravity literature, the variation of trade integration across country
pairs can to a large extent be captured by typical gravity variables such as distance and adjacency but
also by policy-related variables such as membership in the Eurozone or participation in the Schengen
Agreement. But our focus lies on the substantial degree of heterogeneity in trade integration across
industries. Our results suggest that modeling trade costs as a “one-fits-all” impediment is clearly at
odds with empirical evidence.
We investigate the role of several sectoral characteristics in explaining trade integration across in-
dustries, with a particular emphasis on policy-related variables such as the extent of Technical Barriers
to Trade (TBTs). Such barriers are a predominant concern in today’s global trade negotiations, and
for the WTO in particular as it precisely seeks to ensure that “technical regulations and standards,
including packaging, marking and labelling requirements [...] do not create unnecessary obstacles
to international trade.”3 We find that trade integration is indeed lower in countries and industries
where TBTs are strong, suggesting that there is room left for policy action and that further gains
are possible through the reduction of those barriers. We also show that trade integration tends to
be high for industries characterized by high productivity, low transportation costs and a high degree
of transparency in public procurement. From a dynamic perspective, average trade integration has
3Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (p.117). This Agreement, negotiated during the Uruguay Round, is an
integral part of the WTO Agreement.
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improved for most countries over the period 1999-2003, as well as individually for a large number of
industries in our sample.
We also contrast our empirical approach of explaining the variation in bilateral trade integration
to the standard gravity approach of regressing bilateral trade flows. We believe this is an important
exercise that yields two insights. First, our approach allows us to identify the eﬀects of a number
of crucial explanatory variables such as weight-to-value that would normally drop out in a correctly
specified gravity equation due to perfect collinearity with fixed eﬀects. Second, we show that misspec-
ifying a standard gravity equation by omitting multilateral resistance variables leads to a substantial
bias in the estimated trade cost elasticities. Our approach avoids this problem because our trade
integration measure has an in-built control for time-varying multilateral resistance.
The third contribution of the paper is to explore to what extent the increase in trade flows over
recent years can be explained by the decrease in trade barriers. For that purpose, we use our model to
decompose the growth in trade into two main components — (1) the growth of manufacturing output
and (2) improvements in trade integration. We find that on average 58 percent of the growth in trade
can be accounted for by changes in bilateral trade barriers and multilateral resistance, while the rest
can be attributed to the secular growth of manufacturing output. This contribution of improved trade
integration is quantitatively larger than the contribution found by Baier and Bergstrand (2001) for a
sample of OECD countries. As we focus on the European Union, our results suggest that on average,
intra-EU trade integration has progressed faster than integration amongst other developed countries.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop a general equilibrium model with
industry-specific trade costs. In that section we also derive an analytical solution for time-varying
industry-level multilateral resistance variables and our trade integration measure. Section 3 presents
our dataset. Section 4 reports our empirical results, focusing on the determinants and time trend
of trade integration. We also present the decomposition of trade growth into output growth and
improvements in trade integration. Section 5 provides robustness checks and Section 6 concludes.
2 A Model with Industry-Specific Trade Costs
Our model closely follows the seminal paper by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Their general
equilibrium model of trade results in a gravity equation that incorporates trade costs. The key insight
from their gravity equation is that bilateral trade flows are not determined solely by the absolute
bilateral trade barrier between two countries but rather by their bilateral relative to their average
trade barrier. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) refer to the appropriate average trade barrier as
“multilateral resistance.”
As a generalization, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) model bilateral trade for an individual
industry that is characterized by industry-specific bilateral trade costs and an industry-specific elas-
ticity of substitution. We follow Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) in modeling trade flows with
heterogeneous trade costs and heterogeneous elasticities of substitution at the industry level. The
innovation of our approach is to derive an analytical solution for time-varying industry-specific multi-
lateral resistance variables that can be related to observable data. With this solution at hand, we are
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able to derive a micro-founded measure of industry-specific bilateral trade integration that nets out
multilateral resistance eﬀects. Bergstrand (1989, 1990) also derives gravity equations for industry-level
trade flows but does not focus on multilateral resistance.
2.1 The Basic Framework
Denote xkij as nominal exports from country i to country j in goods associated with industry k.
Suppose that consumers in country j allocate expenditure xkj on industry-k goods and that their
preferences over these goods can be described by a standard CES utility function as
Ckj ≡
Ã
JX
i=1
³
ckij
´σk−1
σk
! σk
σk−1
(1)
where ckij is real consumption of industry-k goods from country i by country-j consumers and where
the elasticity of substitution σk is specific to industry k and assumed to exceed unity, σk > 1.
Furthermore suppose that the factory gate price of industry-k goods from country i is denoted by pki
and that trade costs associated with the trade cost factor tkij ≥ 1 are incurred when these goods are
shipped to country j such that the price faced by country-j consumers, denoted by pkij , can be written
as pkij = t
k
ijp
k
i . The demand function for exports x
k
ij = p
k
ijc
k
ij then follows as
xkij =
Ã
pkij
P kj
!1−σk
xkj =
Ã
tkijp
k
i
P kj
!1−σk
xkj (2)
where the price index P kj can be derived as
P kj =
Ã
JX
i=1
³
pkij
´1−σk! 11−σk
(3)
2.2 The Gravity Equation
Denote output of industry-k goods by country-i firms as yki and impose market-clearing as
yki =
JX
j=1
xkij (4)
Substituting the demand function (2) into the market-clearing condition (4) and rearranging yields
pki =
⎛
⎝
JX
j=1
Ã
tkij
P kj
!1−σk xkj
yki
⎞
⎠
1
σk−1
(5)
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Plug equation (5) back into the demand function (2) and, as in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004),
define outward multilateral resistance for industry-k goods from country i as
Πki ≡
⎛
⎝
JX
j=1
Ã
tkij
P kj
!1−σk xkj
yk
⎞
⎠
1
1−σk
(6)
where yk is world output in industry k. Rearrange to arrive at a gravity equation for industry k
xkij =
yki x
k
j
yk
Ã
tkij
Πki P
k
j
!1−σk
(7)
Trade flows xkij depend on supply y
k
i of the k-good from country i and expenditure x
k
j for the good in
country j. Large bilateral trade costs tkij reduce bilateral trade, whereas large average outward trade
barriers of country i (i.e., large Πki ) and large average inward trade barriers of country j (i.e., large
P kj ) lead to more bilateral trade. Substituting the solution for p
k
i in (5) and the definition of Π
k
i in
(6) into the price index (3) yields
P kj =
⎛
⎝
JX
i=1
Ã
tkij
Πki
!1−σk
yki
yk
⎞
⎠
1
1−σk
(8)
which is inward multilateral resistance for industry-k goods entering country j.
2.3 Solving for Multilateral Resistance
A problem that arises in empirical work is that we do not have data for the multilateral resistance
terms P kj and Π
k
i in gravity equation (7). The method we employ here is to solve for these terms
analytically as a function of observable trade flows. We exploit the fact that multilateral resistance
is related to the amount of trade a country conducts with itself (see Novy, 2008). Intuitively, if a
country’s trade barriers with the rest of the world are high (i.e., if the country’s multilateral resistance
is high), the country will trade a lot domestically.
To see this formally, use gravity equation (7) and consider domestic trade flows for industry-k
goods
xkii =
yki x
k
i
yk
µ
tkii
Πki P
k
i
¶1−σk
(9)
where tkii are domestic trade costs for industry-k goods, for example domestic transportation costs.
Equation (9) can be solved for the product of outward and inward multilateral resistance as
Πki P
k
i =
µ
yki x
k
i
xkiiyk
¶ 1
1−σk
tkii (10)
Note that we do not impose zero domestic trade costs since the trade cost factor tkii may exceed unity.
Equation (10) implies that for given tkii and σk, it is easy to measure multilateral resistance since the
quantities on the right-hand side are observable.
5
2.4 A Micro-Founded Measure of Industry-Specific Trade Integration
The solution for multilateral resistance can be exploited to solve the model. Gravity equation (7)
contains the product of outward multilateral resistance of country i and inward multilateral resistance
of country j, Πki P
k
j , whereas equation (10) provides a solution for Π
k
i P
k
i . It is therefore useful to
multiply gravity equation (7) by the corresponding gravity equation for trade flows in the opposite
direction, xkji, to obtain a bidirectional gravity equation that contains both countries’ outward and
inward multilateral resistance variables. This yields
xkijx
k
ji =
yki y
k
j x
k
i x
k
j
ykyk
Ã
tkijt
k
ji
Πki P
k
i Π
k
jP
k
j
!1−σk
(11)
Substitute the solution for multilateral resistance given in equation (10) to obtain
xkijx
k
ji = x
k
iix
k
jj
Ã
tkijt
k
ji
tkiit
k
jj
!1−σk
(12)
From equation (12) it is easy to solve for the trade cost factors as
tkijt
k
ji
tkiit
k
jj
=
Ã
xkiix
k
jj
xkijx
k
ji
! 1
σk−1
(13)
It is only possible to infer relative trade costs, in this case bilateral trade costs tkijt
k
ji relative to
intranational trade costs tkiit
k
jj .
4 We do not impose trade cost symmetry so that tkij and t
k
ji on the
left-hand side of equation (13) may be asymmetric (tkij 6= tkji). As Anderson and van Wincoop (2003,
footnote 11) point out, it is problematic to infer the degree of trade barrier asymmetry from trade
data because there are multiple combinations of tkij and t
k
ji that can give rise to the same trade flows
xkij and x
k
ji. We therefore take the square root to get an expression for the average bilateral trade
barrier. Thus, the average relative trade barrier can be expressed as
θkij ≡
Ã
tkijt
k
ji
tkiit
k
jj
! 1
2
=
Ã
xkiix
k
jj
xkijx
k
ji
! 1
2(σk−1)
(14)
We interpret θkij as a micro-founded measure of bilateral industry-specific trade frictions, or the inverse
of bilateral trade integration. The more two countries trade with each other (i.e., the higher xkijx
k
ji),
the lower is our measure of relative trade frictions ceteris paribus. Conversely, if the two countries
start trading more domestically (i.e., the higher xkiix
k
jj), the higher is our measure of relative trade
frictions ceteris paribus.
For the interpretation of θkij it is also helpful to think of two opposite extreme cases — a frictionless
world with no trade costs on the one hand, and a closed economy on the other. In a frictionless
world, all trade cost factors equal unity (tkij = t
k
ji = t
k
ii = t
k
jj = 1) and θ
k
ij would be one, implying
that bilateral and domestic barriers are the same. In the case approaching a closed economy, bilateral
4On this point also see Anderson and van Wincoop (2004, p.709).
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trade xkijx
k
ji tends towards zero and thus θ
k
ij tends towards infinity, implying that bilateral barriers
are prohibitive relative to domestic barriers.
Last but not least, we stress that our trade integration measure is valid more generally beyond the
particular framework presented above. We have derived θkij in equation (14) from a model based on a
CES demand system in combination with the Armington assumption that goods are diﬀerentiated by
country of origin. But as we show in the technical appendix, we can also derive our trade integration
measure from a range of other leading trade theories. These include the Ricardian trade model by
Eaton and Kortum (2002), Chaney’s (2008) extension of the Melitz (2003) heterogeneous firms model
to asymmetric countries as well as the heterogeneous firms model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
with linear non-CES demand and endogenous markups.
The reason why our trade integration measure θkij is consistent with a broad range of trade models is
related to the fact that they all lead to gravity equations that have a similar structure as equation (7).5
Intuitively, the gravity equation is an expenditure equation that indicates how consumers allocate their
expenditure across countries subject to trade frictions (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). Gravity equations
arise regardless of why consumers want to buy goods from foreign countries. In an Armington world,
consumers buy foreign goods because those goods are inherently diﬀerent and consumers prefer variety.
In a Ricardian world, countries produce goods according to comparative advantage and consumers
buy foreign goods because they are cheaper. It turns out that the particular motivation behind foreign
trade is not crucial to understand the role of trade frictions.6
2.5 A Comparison to Alternative Measures
We now contrast θkij with alternative measures of trade integration. First, compare θ
k
ij with a bilateral
trade to output ratio,
³
xkijx
k
ji
´
/
³
yki y
k
j
´
. Various forms of such ratios have been used as measures of
trade openness (Harrigan, 1996). Dividing gravity equation (11) by yki y
k
j and substituting equation
(10) yields
xkijx
k
ji
yki y
k
j
=
xkiix
k
jj
yki y
k
j
Ã
tkijt
k
ji
tkiit
k
jj
!1−σk
(15)
Theory thus predicts that apart from the trade cost parameters, the bilateral trade to output ratio is
also determined by the two countries’ domestic trade shares,
³
xkiix
k
jj
´
/
³
yki y
k
j
´
.
To compare the trade to output ratio with θkij , take the trade cost parameters tkij , t
k
ji, t
k
ii and t
k
jj
as given. This pins down θkij in equation (14). However, the trade to output ratio can still move. For
5Feenstra, Markusen and Rose (2001) and Evenett and Keller (2002) also show that gravity equations are consistent
with various competing trade models.
6Deardorﬀ (1998) argues that in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework, trade frictions prevent factor price equalization so
that for the large majority of goods, only one country is the lowest-cost producer. In the presence of trade frictions,
trade in a Heckscher-Ohlin world therefore resembles trade in an Armington world. Grossman (1998) provides the
following intuition for the gravity equation: “Specialization lies behind the explanatory power [of the gravity equation],
and of course some degree of specialization is at the heart of any model of trade. Thus, the derivation of the gravity
equation need not make reference to any particular trade model at all [...] This is true no matter what supply-side
considerations give rise to the specialization, be they increasing returns to scale in a world of diﬀerentiated products,
technology diﬀerences in a world of Ricardian trade, large factor endowment diﬀerences in a world of Heckscher-Ohlin
trade, or (small) transport costs in a world of any type of endowment-based trade.” (Emphasis in the original.)
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example, suppose that trade costs with a third country increase, say, tkim with m 6= i, j. The increase
in tkim pushes up the domestic trade ratio x
k
ii/y
k
i and therefore also the bilateral trade to output ratio
in equation (15).7 But this is a multilateral resistance movement and does not imply that trade
integration between i and j has improved. In contrast, θkij does not react to multilateral resistance
movements because θkij only reflects changes in bilateral and domestic trade costs, not changes in
third-party trade costs. In conclusion, trade to output ratios are distorted by multilateral resistance
eﬀects.
Second, compare θkij with the “phi-ness” of trade, which is given by the simple ratio of bilateral to
domestic trade flows and is commonly used to estimate sectoral border eﬀects (Baldwin et al., 2003,
Head and Mayer, 2004, Head and Ries, 2001).8 Theory shows that the border eﬀect can arise because
a high degree of substitution between domestic and imported goods may lead to a high responsiveness
of trade flows even in the case of very modest trade barriers. However, in an industry with a high
elasticity σk, consumers are so price-sensitive that a high ratio of domestic over bilateral trade does
not necessarily reflect high bilateral trade barriers but rather a high degree of competition.9 The
definition of θkij combines the phi-ness measure with an exponent that involves the industry-specific
elasticity of substitution σk so in contrast to phi-ness, θkij is able to separate this competition eﬀect
from the trade barrier eﬀect. As equation (14) shows, a higher elasticity of substitution implies lower
trade frictions θkij . Likewise, as we show in the technical appendix, the theoretical models by Eaton
and Kortum (2002), Chaney (2008) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) also require that the trade ratio
be scaled by an industry-specific exponent. We therefore argue that θkij improves on the phi-ness
measure because it accounts for diﬀerences in market power and competition across industries.10
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
To compute our measure of trade integration θkij across industries, countries and time, we need the
domestic trade of countries i and j in industry k, xkii and x
k
jj , as well as their bilateral exports,
xkij and x
k
ji, at time t. As in previous literature (for instance, Chen, 2004, Evans, 2003, Head and
Mayer, 2000, Nitsch, 2000, Wei, 1996), domestic trade for country i is given by its gross output
in industry k, yki , minus total exports of country i to the rest of the world in that industry. The
elasticities of substitution σk are taken from Hummels (2001a).11 Our sample includes trade flows for
166 manufacturing industries across 11 EU countries at the 4-digit Nace rev.1 level between 1999 and
2003. The sample is balanced over time. The 11 countries are Austria, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom. In the data
appendix we provide a detailed description of the data and their sources.12
7Formally, the increase in multilateral resistance follows from equation (6), implying an increase in xkii through
equation (10).
8Alternatively, border eﬀects can be estimated from a gravity equation that combines domestic and international
trade flows as the dependent variable (Chen, 2004, Evans, 2003, McCallum, 1996, Wei, 1996, Wolf, 2000).
9The standard CES markup is given by σk/(σk − 1) and thus inversely related to σk.
10We show in Section 5 that regressions based on the phi -ness measure yield a considerably lower R2 than regressions
of θkij .
11Hanson and Xiang (2004) also use the elasticities from Hummels (2001a).
12Due to data limitations not all possible trade flow combinations across industries and countries are available. Al-
though it would in principle be possible to span the longer period from 1997 to 2003, this would come at the cost of
losing all observations for Germany, a core EU country, because German sectoral output data are missing prior to 1999.
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Our dataset comprises a total of 15,040 domestic and bilateral trade flow observations. Only five
bilateral trade flows are equal to zero, which is not surprising given the huge volume of intra-industry
trade in the EU.13 Those five cases would normally feature as missing values of θkij . But zero trade
flows may contain valuable information as to why such low levels of trade are observed. It therefore
seems more appropriate to associate these cases with large trade frictions. The approach we adopt is
to replace the zeros with a value of one Euro, thus associating them with large values of θkij .14
Table 1 contains summary statistics for individual industries. Due to space constraints we list
industries at the more aggregated 3-digit level, reporting averages of θkij over the lower-level 4-digit
classifications as well as their maximum and minimum values. Industries are ordered by decreasing
value of θk, which ranges from 146.91 to 1.15. We also report the average elasticities of substitution
σk and the average weight-to-value ratios, measured as kilograms per Euro exported.
A first cursory glance at Table 1 attests the intuitive nature of the trade integration measure θkij .
Trade integration is lowest for Bricks, followed by Cement, lime, plaster. The latter is also the industry
with the largest average weight-to-value ratio (over 13 kg/Euro), indicating a very low transportability
of the goods. Another related industry is Articles of concrete. Note that the geographic market for
cement and concrete is very local since the perishable nature of such “wet” products constrains the
distance over which they can be delivered.
Printing and Publishing are traded very little, too, which is hardly surprising given the reliance
of such products on specific languages. This finding is consistent with earlier studies showing that
trade in such sectors is subdued. Harrigan (1996) shows that the volume of trade relative to output
in the OECD in 1985 is the lowest in Printing and Publishing. Finally, some of the sectors with high
values of θk belong to the food industry, for which the perishability of many goods is most likely an
important deterrent to trade. For example, Fruit and vegetables are ranked in fourth place, and Other
food products display the biggest individual value of θk equal to 1,056.
Table 2 reports the average level of θi for the 11 individual countries in our sample. Ireland appears
as the least integrated country, followed by Spain, Denmark, Finland and Italy, whereas France, the
Netherlands and Germany are the most trade integrated.
Finally, Figure 1 plots the time series evolution of θt, averaged across countries and industries. It
is interesting to observe that despite fluctuations from one year to the next, trade frictions display
a downward trend, suggesting that the countries and industries we consider have on average become
more bilaterally integrated over time.
4 Empirical Results
In the first part of this section, we analyze the determinants of trade integration across country
pairs, industries and years. In the second part, we explain how our approach diﬀers from standard
13The three industries with zero trade flows are Publishing of newspapers, Builders’ carpentry and joinery and Mat-
tresses. We consider those observations as “true zeros” because the corresponding output values are positive but exports
are zero. We exclude the cases where output is zero but exports are positive as well as the cases where both output and
exports are zero.
14Our treatment of the zero trade flows does not distort the overall results, see the robustness check in Section 5.
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gravity. In the third part, we focus on the time series patterns of trade integration. In the fourth
part, we decompose the growth in trade over the sample period into two components — the growth in
manufacturing output and improvements in trade integration.
4.1 The Determinants of Trade Integration
We first analyze the determinants of bilateral EU trade integration. We estimate
ln θkij,t = ψt + λK + β Geo
k
ij,t + ζ Policy
k
ij,t + α Costs
k
ij,t + γ Controls
k
ij,t + 
k
ij,t (16)
where Geokij,t is a set of variables related to geography and transportation costs, Policy
k
ij,t is a set
of policy-related factors, Costskij,t includes other types of costs such as fixed costs of exporting and
productivity, and Controlskij,t includes variables controlling for measurement issues. Given that some
of the explanatory variables vary across sectors only, we include industry fixed eﬀects λK at the more
aggregated level of 3-digit industries, assuming that the 4-digit groupings k are diﬀerent varieties
of the corresponding, more aggregated 3-digit sector K (Hummels, 2001a). The inclusion of other
explanatory variables that only vary across country pairs precludes us from controlling for country pair
fixed eﬀects.15 ψt denotes year intercepts. β, ζ, α and γ are vectors of coeﬃcients to be estimated and
kij,t is an error term. A higher value of θ
k
ij should be interpreted as a lower degree of trade integration.
We estimate our baseline results with OLS. To control for possible autocorrelation in each of the
individual series of the panel, robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the 4-digit Nace
rev.1 level in each country pair (15,040/5 = 3,008 clusters). As a robustness check, we also report
results obtained by Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimation, see Section 5.
Geography/Transportation Costs Variables Table 3 reports our main results. Column (1)
only includes variables that are related to geography and transportation costs. Across countries, stan-
dard gravity variables perform well in explaining the variation in trade integration. Trade integration
decreases with international distances Dij and increases with domestic distances Dii×Djj . It is higher
between countries that share a common border Adjij and a common language Langij .
We also consider proxies of transportation costs that vary across industries. First, we consider
the ratio of c.i.f. and f.o.b. trade values for each industry and country pair, averaged in each year
across all EU partners in order to minimize measurement error, cfobkt (Harrigan, 1993).16 Second, we
consider the weight-to-value ratio of exports for each industry and country pair, also averaged in each
year across all partners, wvkt . We do not consider bilateral weight-to-value ratios as Hillberry and
Hummels (2000) show that bilateral weight-to-value significantly falls with distance. This suggests
that the commodity composition of trade is sensitive to bilateral costs and that weight-to-value is
endogenous.17 Overall, since the freight component of trade costs is higher for bulky, high weight-to-
value raw materials than for manufactures, weight-to-value should be associated with higher values for
θkij . As expected, higher transportation costs as proxied by cfobkt and wvkt decrease trade integration.
15As a robustness check, we show that our results hold up with country pair fixed eﬀects, see Section 5.
16Apart from insurance and other possible discrepancies between partners, the ratio of c.i.f. and f.o.b. for intra-EU
trade values mostly captures transportation costs by road. In 1998, 57.8 percent of total intra-EU15 trade went by road,
22.8 percent by sea, 3.9 percent by rail, 3.9 percent by air, 0.9 percent by inland waterways and 0.8 percent by pipeline
(European Commission, 2000).
17Harrigan (2005) and Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) also find that export unit values are positively related to distance.
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Policy Variables In Column (2) we consider the role of several policy-related factors in aﬀecting
trade integration. Across countries, we include a dummy variable for Finland and Austria, FI,ATij ,
as these two countries were the last in our sample to join the EU (in 1995), and they appear less
integrated compared to the other countries. We also explore the eﬀect of not adopting the Euro by
including a dummy variable, noEUROij,t, which is equal to one for Denmark and the United Kingdom
from 2002 onwards when the common currency was introduced.18 As expected, non-adoption of the
Euro has lowered the extent of trade integration for these two countries since 2002.
We also add a variable to capture the eﬀects of the Schengen Agreement which abolishes phys-
ical border controls among participating EU countries. The date of the first implementation of the
agreement diﬀers across countries. Ireland and the United Kingdom have not started implementation
yet. The coeﬃcient on this variable, Schengenij,t, is negative and highly significant in Column (2),
suggesting that the abolition of border controls among the participating countries has helped to foster
trade integration, most probably through the elimination of time delays and administrative burdens
that were previously experienced at borders.
We also consider policy variables that vary across industries. First, we address the role of Tech-
nical Barriers to Trade (TBTs). TBTs result from norms (regulations and standards) that aﬀect the
sale of goods in some markets by requiring specific product characteristics or production processes.
Baldwin (2000) stresses the importance of TBTs in shaping trade flows between countries and in-
dustries. He argues that in the case of Europe, such barriers have become more and more visible
over time, especially since tariﬀ barriers were completely eliminated by 1968.19 In addition, TBTs
are a predominant concern in today’s global trade negotiations and for the WTO in particular. Data
on TBTs are hard to find, however, so our approach to measuring TBTs uses two diﬀerent sources
of information: a cross-country survey of EU managers who reveal whether they consider TBTs a
problem for trade, and a ranking of industries according to the relevance of TBTs. The interacted
variable, TBT kij , increases with the extent of TBTs across countries and industries. The data appen-
dix provides details. In Column (2) TBTs are found to lower trade integration, suggesting that some
room is left for policy action and that the removal of such barriers might promote trade integration.
This result is consistent with Chen (2004) who finds that TBTs in Europe are associated with larger
border eﬀects in international trade.
As is often the case, results based on survey data should be interpreted with caution. In particular,
the cross-country measurement of TBTs might be problematic. For instance, if a manager states that
TBTs are not a problem, this does not necessarily mean that TBTs are absent or unimportant.
Instead, if that manager’s company or industry is protected by TBTs initiated by his country, he
might actually prefer them. This possibility might bias our cross-country measurement of TBTs.20 In
Column (3) we therefore report estimates when only including our industry-specific variable on TBTs,
18The Euro exchange rates were fixed in 1999 but Euro notes and coins and thus a greater degree of transparency only
followed in 2002. The huge literature on the trade-creating eﬀects of currency unions raises the issue of endogeneity of
the common currency dummy (Rose, 2000, Baldwin, 2006). In this paper we do not attempt to address this issue.
19As explained by Baldwin (2000, p.255), “Europe’s first liberalization eﬀorts focused on the ‘easy’ barriers, tariﬀs
and quotas. With these eliminated by 1968, liberalization attention turned to TBTs.”
20 If this is indeed the case, we will underestimate the impact of TBTs on trade integration so that our coeﬃcients can
be considered lower-bound estimates.
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TBT k. The results remain consistent, i.e., when TBTs are high, trade integration is low.21
Furthermore, it is well-established that national governments often favor domestic over foreign
firms for some of their purchases, even if foreign suppliers could actually oﬀer them a better deal
(Davies and Lyons, 1996). Firms in such “public procurement” markets are hence protected from
foreign imports, sometimes to such an extent that trade may be completely suppressed. In the last
few years, competition has been steadily increasing in those markets, with the proportion of EU15
public procurement contracts openly advertised in the Oﬃcial Journal of the EU steadily increasing
from 8.4 percent in 1995 to 16.8 percent in 2005 (Eurostat). To investigate whether this opening of the
markets has helped to lower trade frictions, we rely on time-varying cross-country data on the share
of public procurement contracts advertised in the Oﬃcial Journal and compute the average across
partners. As similar data across industries are not always available, we compute an indicator variable
for high public procurement sectors.22 We interact this indicator variable with the time-varying data
for each country pair, denoting the variable so obtained by Prockij,t. Column (2) reveals that the
opening of public procurement markets to foreign competition has indeed been successful in fostering
trade integration across countries and industries and over time.
Next, Value-Added Taxes (VATs), which diﬀer extensively across EU countries and goods, are
characterized by the so-called “destination principle”: VAT for a good is paid in the country where
it is sold, not where it is manufactured, implying that VATs uniformly aﬀect domestic trade and
imports. In our model, the imposition of VATs by country i thus increases both domestic costs tii
and importing costs tji by the same proportion, leaving bilateral trade integration θkij unchanged. In
Column (2) we include the log of one plus the average VAT rate across partners at the sectoral level,
V AT kij , and interestingly find that higher VATs are associated with significantly lower trade frictions.
One possible interpretation relates to VAT fraud. Baldwin (2006) documents that VAT fraud
is a very serious problem in the EU. Since the removal of Europe’s internal borders in 1993, trade
statistics are now collected by VAT authorities, creating a direct correlation between trade statistics
and VAT fraud: EU firms have an incentive to over-report their exports (to get the VAT rebate) and
to under-report their imports (which are subject to VAT). This inflates export statistics relative to
import statistics. As a result, in the countries and industries where VATs are high, the value of θkij
might be lower simply because intra-EU export statistics are inflated due to VAT fraud.23
Other Costs The new trade literature on heterogeneous firms rationalizes why some firms export
and others do not. In particular, the models by Melitz (2003), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and
others show that only the most productive firms participate in foreign markets. Only those firms are
productive enough to cover the fixed costs of exporting or to withstand tough competition on foreign
markets. Due to this selection eﬀect we should observe that ceteris paribus, more productive industries
trade more on foreign markets than less productive industries, i.e., we should observe a negative
21The use of this sectoral variable on TBTs might be criticized on the grounds that it captures changes in TBTs rather
than levels (see the data appendix). As in Chen (2004), we experimented using a dummy variable only, which is equal
to one when TBTs are present. The results remain unaﬀected.
22Examples of high public procurement industries are Shipbuilding, Rail stock, Pharmaceuticals, Aerospace, Telecoms.
23 If the intra-EU exports of country i are inflated because of VAT fraud, then xkij will be high relative to xkii, leading
to a lower value of θkij .
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relationship between productivity and trade frictions θkij . In Column (4) of Table 3 we therefore
include average real labor productivity across industries and countries. Moreover, a growing empirical
literature shows that as trade costs fall, less eﬃcient firms exit from the market and average industry
productivity increases (for example, see Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2006, for the U.S. and Greenaway
and Kneller, 2008, for the UK). To mitigate potential endogeneity problems we lag productivity by one
year, Prodkij,t−1, reducing the number of observations by one cross section. The negative relationship
between productivity and θkij confirms the prediction that more productive industries trade more on
foreign markets.24
We also include a dummy variable in Column (4) that controls for the five zero trade observations
in our sample, Zeroskij,t. We find that trade frictions between two countries in a given industry are
stronger whenever either of them does not export. As models of heterogeneous firms typically predict
that firms only export if they are able to cover the fixed costs of exporting, the result might reflect
the role of these fixed costs.
Controls Finally, we control for some measurement issues and the possibility that the magni-
tude of θkij may be aﬀected by the nature of trade. In particular, the value of θ
k
ij computed under
intra-industry trade will be lower than under comparative advantage driven by technology or factor
endowment diﬀerences across countries, even if the actual friction is the same.25 To control for this
potential bias we compute the (absolute) diﬀerence in capital shares between countries and industries
in order to proxy for diﬀerences in factor endowments. For a larger diﬀerential in capital shares, trade
is more likely based on comparative advantage, leading to an overestimated θkij . This variable, KSkij,t,
displays the expected positive (but insignificant) coeﬃcient in Column (5) but its inclusion leaves the
coeﬃcients on the other variables virtually unchanged.
The previous reasoning presumes that diﬀerences in factor endowments can be fully captured by
diﬀerences in capital shares, the latter being computed at the industry level. One obvious limitation
stems from the use of data disaggregated at the level of industries and not at the level of products.
Industry classifications inevitably aggregate many diﬀerent types of products into one single category
so that the volume of intra-industry trade can appear more important than it actually is. For instance,
many diﬀerent types of steel are produced, from flat-rolled to specialty steels, and it may be that
the production of some types of steel requires resources or technologies in which one country has a
comparative advantage. However, since all these types of steel are aggregated into one category, it
appears as if the countries export and import almost identical products while in reality they export
one type of steel and import another type.
Thus, the larger the number of varieties in each industry category, the more likely the industry
aggregates trade flows with diﬀerent comparative advantages in diﬀerent varieties, but in the data
this will show up as intra-industry trade, i.e., more balanced trade flows between the two countries.
24We also tried to use data on productivity for a country that is not included in our sample, i.e., the US. But those
data are aggregated at the 2-digit level and proved insignificant in explaining trade integration across EU countries,
possibly due to the higher level of aggregation.
25With intra-industry trade, the denominator of (14) will be given by the product of two balanced trade flows. But
with comparative advantage, the denominator of (14) will be given by the product of two unbalanced trade flows, leading
to a relatively small magnitude in the denominator and thus overestimated trade frictions.
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The resulting θkij is therefore expected to be smaller because the denominator in equation (14) is
the product of two more or less balanced (intra-industry) trade flows at the industry level, masking
imbalances of (inter-industry) trade flows at the product level.26 To control for this aggregation bias,
we include the number of product categories within each industry, Goodsk. In Column (5) it is indeed
the case that a larger number of varieties is associated with a lower value for θkij . But the inclusion of
this control hardly aﬀects other estimates.
In Column (6) we replicate the specification of Column (5) but replace the country-varying variable
on TBTs by the sectoral variable, TBT k. It is reassuring that all results remain virtually unchanged,
providing some evidence that they are not biased by the use of cross-country survey data on TBTs.
Finally, Table 4 reports a variance decomposition to illustrate the quantitative contribution of each
factor in explaining the variation of θkij . Following Fields (2003), the contribution of each explanatory
variable xm to the total variance of θkij,t is calculated as cm = βmcov
¡
xm, θkij,t
¢
/var
¡
θkij,t
¢
where βm is
the partial regression coeﬃcient of θkij,t on the explanatory variable xm (holding all other explanatory
variables constant). Columns (1) and (2) correspond to regressions (5) and (6) in Table 3, respectively.
Column (1) shows that regression (5) in Table 3 explains 80.8 percent of the variation in θkij,t.
42.8 percent is attributable to the 3-digit industry fixed eﬀects and 0.01 percent to the year fixed
eﬀects. Of the 38 percent that the remaining regressors explain, geography and transport costs alone
are responsible for about 25 percent of the variation in θkij , the most important factor being weight-to-
value (16.7 percent), followed by bilateral distance (5.4 percent). Policy variables explain 7.6 percent
of the variation in θkij , which is far from negligible. TBTs are the most important factor (4.5 percent),
while public procurement, Schengen and opting out of the Euro only play minor roles. The number of
product categories within each industry explains up to 5.4 percent of the variation in θkij . Finally, the
decomposition reported in Column (2), which corresponds to regression (6) in Table 3, gives similar
results.
4.2 How Our Approach Diﬀers from Standard Gravity
We now compare our specification to the standard gravity approach and illustrate the empirical pitfalls
of not taking the theory seriously. We believe this is an important and necessary exercise.
Although specification (16) is related to standard gravity estimation, there are three important
diﬀerences. First, standard gravity uses output yki y
k
j as the size variable. In contrast, the trade
integration measure θkij includes domestic trade xkiix
k
jj because this nets out the multilateral resistance
variables. Second, correctly specified gravity equations have to include time-varying industry fixed
eﬀects for each country pair to control for multilateral resistance variables (Baldwin and Taglioni,
2006). But a practical problem is that these fixed eﬀects are perfectly collinear with many explanatory
variables of interest such as cfobkt and wvkt in Table 3. We avoid this problem since θ
k
ij nets out the
time-varying multilateral resistance variables. Third, our theory calls for trade cost elasticities that
vary across industries. Those are embodied in θkij .
26The product of two balanced trade flows yields a relatively large magnitude in the denominator and thus a relatively
low θkij .
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We now evaluate the bias that arises in standard gravity equations due to the omission of multi-
lateral resistance and the assumption of coeﬃcient homogeneity across industries. In its simplest form
(henceforth the “naive” model), the traditional gravity model relates bilateral trade to output and
bilateral trade costs where the trade cost elasticity α2 is assumed to be the same across industries:
ln
³
xkijx
k
ji
´
= α1 ln
³
yki y
k
j
´
+ α2 ln
³
tkijt
k
ji
´
+ kij (17)
We drop time subscripts for simplicity. Compare the naive specification in equation (17) to the
log-linearized version of micro-founded gravity equation (12):
ln
³
xkijx
k
ji
´
= β1 ln
³
xkiix
k
jj
´
+ β2 (1− σk) ln
³
tkijt
k
ji
´
− β3 (1− σk) ln
³
tkiit
k
jj
´
+ kij (18)
The size variable is domestic trade instead of output. Moreover, equation (18) includes domestic
trade costs and the trade cost coeﬃcients now vary across industries.27 An alternative micro-founded
gravity specification can be obtained by log-linearizing equation (11):
ln
³
xkijx
k
ji
´
= ln
³
yki y
k
j
´
+ ln
Ã
xki x
k
j
ykyk
!
+ (1− σk) ln
³
tkijt
k
ji
´
+ (σk − 1)
³
Πki P
k
i Π
k
jP
k
j
´
To control for the unobservable multilateral resistance variables Πki P
k
i Π
k
jP
k
j , we include fixed eﬀects
for each industry (at the 4-digit level) in each year and separately for countries i and j, denoted by
γki and γ
k
j . Such fixed eﬀects also wipe out the domestic demand terms (if included separately for
each country) and world output in industry k. To ease the comparison with the naive specification,
we keep the domestic output terms so that we estimate
ln
³
xkijx
k
ji
´
= δ1 ln
³
yki y
k
j
´
+ δ2 (1− σk) ln
³
tkijt
k
ji
´
+ γki + γ
k
j + 
k
ij (19)
To keep our exposition as simple as possible, we assume that trade costs (domestic and international)
are proxied by the log of distance only. We then estimate the naive specification (17) and compare
its distance elasticity to the ones estimated in the micro-founded specifications (18) and (19). Table
5 reports our results. The upper panel refers to naive gravity while the two lower panels refer to the
micro-founded models. For all panels, Column (1) assumes homogeneity on the trade cost coeﬃcient
across industries (bilateral and domestic). We relax this assumption in Column (2) where we report
the average of the elasticities estimated for individual industries. In Columns (3) and (4), we replicate
the specifications in Columns (1) and (2) but we allow the output variables, domestic distances and
domestic trade to enter separately for each country.
As can be seen in Column (1) of the upper panel, the naive gravity equation yields an absolute
distance elasticity of 3.589, which increases slightly to 3.741 once we allow for coeﬃcient heterogeneity
in Column (2).28 The sectoral output regressor displays a coeﬃcient slightly larger than the unity
value predicted by theory. All elasticities remain similar in Columns (3) and (4).
27Combes, Lafourcade and Mayer (2005, equation 13) estimate a form of equation (18) where they constrain β1 to
unity. But they use aggregate trade data so that by construction the trade cost elasticity cannot vary across industries.
28The magnitude of this coeﬃcient is larger than that typically obtained in the literature because the dependent
variable is the product of bilateral exports and not unidirectional bilateral exports.
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The middle panel turns to the micro-founded specification in (18). The coeﬃcients on domestic
distances and domestic trade flows are significant with the expected signs. But the coeﬃcients on
bilateral distance are markedly diﬀerent. In Column (1), the absolute magnitude of the distance
elasticity is large and equal to 4.514. It further increases to 5.131 once we allow for coeﬃcient
heterogeneity, as required by theory.29 As highlighted by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and
Baldwin and Taglioni (2006), the omission of multilateral resistance biases the magnitude of trade
cost variables. The magnitude of the distance elasticity in the naive specification is underestimated by
30 percent (3.589/5.131-1 = -0.30) and by 28 percent if we allow the other controls to enter separately
for each country (3.629/5.045-1 = -0.28). The omitted variable bias goes in the direction predicted
by theory.30
The lower panel focuses on the micro-founded specification with fixed eﬀects. The fixed eﬀects
do a good job in eliminating the bias on the distance coeﬃcient. The distance elasticity is 4.204 in
Column (1) and increases to 4.653 when we allow for coeﬃcient heterogeneity in Column (2). In
absolute terms, those elasticities are not as large as in the other micro-founded specification but the
diﬀerence is relatively small (between 7 and 9 percent).
In summary, we show that omitting multilateral resistance (and assuming coeﬃcient homogeneity
across industries) yields biased distance elasticities, and the bias can be large (up to 30 percent in our
sample). Our original specification (16) is consistent with the estimation of the micro-founded gravity
equation (18), which diﬀers from standard gravity regressions by including domestic trade as the size
variable. In principle, fixed eﬀect estimation in equation (19) is a viable micro-founded alternative but
it obviates the identification of many explanatory variables of interest such as cfobkt and wvkt because
they are linear combinations of the fixed eﬀects.
4.3 The Evolution of Trade Integration over Time
To investigate the evolution of trade integration over time, we run the following regression
ln θkij,t = γ
k
ij + ψt + α lnwv
k
ij,t + ε
k
ij,t (20)
where γkij are country pair dummies interacted with industry intercepts (at the 4-digit level) to control
for systematic diﬀerences between trade partners in each industry. The bilateral weight-to-value wvkij,t
controls for compositional change over time (see Hummels, 2007).31 The evolution of θkij is given by
the estimated coeﬃcients on the year dummies ψt. The annualized growth rate of these coeﬃcients
obtained from estimating equation (20) is equal to -0.94 percent over our pooled sample with a t-
statistic of 11.48.32 This result is highly significant and we conclude that trade integration has on
average improved between 1999 and 2003.
29Chen (2004) also finds that the inclusion of fixed eﬀects to control for multilateral resistance leads to larger magni-
tudes of the distance coeﬃcients.
30The naive gravity equation yields a distance elasticity ?α2 such that E (?α2) = α2 + ab where α2 < 0 is the true
elasticity, a = ∂ ln (ΠiPiΠjPj) /∂ ln (tijtji) > 0 and b = (σk − 1) > 0. The bias, equal to ab > 0, therefore leads to an
underestimation of the absolute magnitude of the distance elasticity.
31 In contrast to Section 4.1, we now consider the bilateral weight-to-value as distance is not included in the regression.
32The significance is calculated using the delta method.
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We also estimate equation (20) separately for each industry. Figure 2 plots the annualized growth
rates for the individual industries, distinguishing between significant (at the ten percent level) and
insignificant growth rates.33 About half of the industries did not experience any significant change
over time (82 industries out of 160). However, among the industries that did, the vast majority
(69 out of 78 significant) experienced an increase in trade integration. Games and toys display the
strongest improvement, while trade integration worsened for Articles of concrete followed by Paper
and Explosives. Note that according to equation (14), in the few cases where θkij increases over time,
the worsening in bilateral trade integration could reflect a fall in domestic trade costs, tkiit
k
jj , rather
than an increase in bilateral trade costs, tkijt
k
ji.
Lacking any product or firm-level data, we are not able to investigate whether the deepening of
trade integration over time is due to the extensive or intensive margin of trade. On the one hand,
Hummels and Klenow (2005) report evidence in favor of the extensive margin, while Helpman, Melitz
and Rubinstein (2008) and Besedeš and Prusa (2007) argue that the intensive margin is quantitatively
more important. To investigate this issue we would ideally need to observe more years and more highly
disaggregated data. We leave this question for future research.
4.4 Explaining the Growth in Trade
Baier and Bergstrand (2001) try to explain the growth of world trade by tracing two fundamental
channels through which trade can grow — (1) the growth of income and (2) reductions in trade barriers.
For that purpose, they estimate a gravity equation in first diﬀerences and use the gravity coeﬃcients
to extrapolate the contributions of income growth and trade barrier reductions to the average growth
of trade in their sample.
We use our model to perform a similar exercise of decomposing the growth of trade into these
two contributions. But our approach diﬀers on three counts. First, our approach is considerably
easier to implement because our solution for time-varying multilateral resistance variables allows us
to eliminate the unobservable and highly nonlinear price indices that appear in Baier and Bergstrand’s
(2001) gravity equation. Second, we use industry-level trade data instead of aggregate trade data.
Third, our decomposition is not restricted to the sample average because we are able to provide
decompositions for specific bilateral observations in each industry. These finer decompositions allow
us to uncover a substantial degree of heterogeneity across various cuts of our dataset.
Our decomposition is based on gravity equation (11), which can be rearranged as
xkijx
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k
i y
k
j
Ã
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(21)
33We can only estimate equation (20) separately for 160 industries because of too few degrees of freedom for the other
6 industries. To conserve space we do not report the annualized growth rates for each industry but they are available
upon request.
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Using the solution for the multilateral resistance terms in (10), we can express the last two fractions
on the right-hand side of equation (21) in terms of observable variables, yielding
xkijx
k
ji = y
k
i y
k
j
³
θkij
´2(1−σk) xkii
yki
xkjj
ykj
(22)
We now take logs and first diﬀerences of equation (22) and divide by the left-hand side to obtain our
decomposition equation
100% =
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The denominator on the right-hand side of equation (23), ∆ ln
³
xkijx
k
ji
´
, is the growth of bilateral
trade between countries i and j in industry k. The first factor thus represents the contribution of
output growth, ∆ ln
³
yki y
k
j
´
, to the growth of bilateral trade.
The second factor is the contribution of trade integration in that industry. If bilateral trade
frictions decline relative to domestic trade frictions, then ∆ ln
¡
θkij
¢
< 0. As σk > 1, it follows
that the contribution of declining bilateral trade frictions is positive (given positive trade growth
∆ ln
³
xkijx
k
ji
´
> 0). The change in the domestic trade to output ratios, ∆ ln
µ
xkii
yki
xkjj
ykj
¶
, reflects changes
in multilateral factors. In particular, from equation (21) it can be seen that this captures changes in
world demand shares and changes in multilateral resistance relative to domestic trade costs.
Based on annual changes, we first calculate the two factors in equation (23) for each country pair-
industry observation. To avoid giving undue weight to quantitatively unimportant observations that
only represent a small fraction of total trade, we then compute a weighted average where the weights
are the products of sectoral bilateral exports in the initial year 1999.34
Table 6 reports the average growth in trade and the contributions of the two factors. In the full
sample, trade grew on average by 7.96 percent over the period.35 42 percent of this trade expansion
can be accounted for by changes in the trading partners’ output growth, whereas changes in trade
integration account for 58 percent of the growth in trade. These proportions are diﬀerent from those
reported by Baier and Bergstrand (2001) who argue that two-thirds of the growth in trade amongst
OECD countries between 1958 and 1988 can be explained by the growth of output. Our results
therefore suggest that trade integration amongst EU countries over our sample period has progressed
relatively faster. Likewise, Jacks, Meissner and Novy (2008) find that more than half of the global
trade boom between 1870 and 1913 is attributable to reductions in trade costs.
34Unweighted decompositions are very similar to the weighted decompositions reported in the paper and are available
upon request.
35To be precise, this is the average annual growth rate of the product of bilateral trade, xkijxkji, weighted as described
above.
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The next rows of the table focus on various subsamples.36 These finer decompositions show that
the extent to which trade expansion is aﬀected by trade integration is strongly limited by geography
and transportation costs, both across countries and industries. The contribution of trade integration
is larger for countries that are separated by short distances (79 percent) or adjacent to each other (72
percent), and for goods that are easier and cheaper to transport, i.e., with a low c.i.f./f.o.b. value
(74 percent) and a low weight-to-value ratio (63 percent).37 The latter two findings are consistent
with some recent evidence showing that the relative price of air to non-air shipping has declined over
time (Hummels, 2007, Choate, 2008). Such a decrease in relative costs should encourage trade in
air transported goods, which are indeed characterized by a low weight-to-value (or low c.i.f./f.o.b.).
Finally, Table 6 shows that speaking a common language, which is of course correlated with short
distances and adjacency, is also associated with a higher contribution of trade integration (76 percent).
The eﬀectiveness of trade integration in promoting the growth in trade is also influenced by
policy factors. On average, the contribution of trade integration is slightly stronger for Finland and
Austria than for the other countries in the sample (64 percent against 56 percent).38 This indicates
that Finland and Austria, who only joined the EU in 1995, experienced a somewhat faster rate of
integration. Interestingly, non-Eurozone countries only experienced a very small increase (equal to
0.32 percent) in trade with Eurozone countries since 2002, which is consistent with our earlier finding
that the introduction of the Euro has hampered the integration of those countries. Moreover, changes
in trade integration only had a minor eﬀect on the trade growth of Euro outsiders (15 percent versus
79 percent for Eurozone countries). This indicates that in contrast to the Eurozone, the trade growth
of Euro outsiders was predominantly driven by secular output growth, not by improvements in trade
integration.39
We then repeat the exercise for subsamples in which none, one or both of the partners have
implemented the Schengen Agreement. Consistent with our previous findings, the elimination of
physical borders seems to have greatly fostered trade. Trade integration accounts for 76 percent of
the growth in trade when both partners have implemented the Agreement but for only 21 percent
when just one has joined. Trade integration has actually declined for the pairs in which none of the
partners has implemented the Agreement so that the contribution is negative (-44 percent).
The pattern of the results is somewhat diﬀerent once we focus on industry-specific characteristics
such as TBTs and the transparency of public procurement. In all three cases, changes in trade
integration have been most eﬀective where trade barriers were initially higher, i.e., in industries
aﬀected by high TBTs (83 percent) and markets with a low transparency in public procurement (76
percent). This indicates that the process of EU integration has been to some degree successful in
overcoming such barriers. Finally, trade expansion in highly productive industries is predominantly
driven by changes in trade integration (88 percent), whereas changes in output are still the main
driver of trade growth in low productivity industries.
36We do not report decompositions for VAT, capital shares or the number of goods in each sector as those are only
included in our earlier regressions to control for possible measurement error.
37The sample is split at the mean value of the variable in question in 1999, denoted by † in Table 6.
38Given that those relative contributions are calculated and not estimated, we are not able to test whether the diﬀerence
between these two numbers is significant.
39As we only focus on the post-2002 period, note that the sample size is much smaller than in the full sample.
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5 Robustness
In this section we report a number of alternative specifications that we implement to ensure the
robustness of our conclusions. First, we estimate our main specification by Poisson Pseudo-Maximum
Likelihood (PPML) as recommended by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). They show that under
heteroskedasticity, coeﬃcient estimates from log-linear regressions estimated by OLS can be strongly
biased. Martin and Pham (2008) confirm that the PPML estimator solves the heteroskedasticity bias
problem, but instead show that this estimator yields severely biased estimates when the dependent
variable takes on many zero values. As our dependent variable has virtually no zero values but
heteroskedasticity might be present, the PPML estimator appears adequate as a robustness check.
But as Column (1) of Table A1 shows, there are no qualitative changes and generally only small
quantitative changes in the estimation results compared to those obtained with OLS.
Second, we verify in Columns (2) and (3) that the results are robust to the inclusion of country
pair fixed eﬀects interacted with year dummies and to the exclusion of the series that contain zero
trade observations.40 We also want to make sure that our results are not driven by observations that
are economically small. For instance, in Table 3 we find that the eﬀect of remaining outside the
Eurozone is significant. But the dummy that captures the eﬀect is equal to unity in only 1,796 cases
out of a total of 15,040 observations (i.e., 12 percent of the sample), and roughly half of those cases
involve Denmark, one of the smallest economies in our sample. We therefore run a regression where
the observations are weighted by the product of sectoral bilateral exports in the initial year 1999. The
results, reported in Column (4), reveal that a significant Eurozone eﬀect is still present.
With panel data, one issue relates to the computation of θkij in real terms. Ideally, for deflating we
would need domestic price indices for the numerator and export price indices for the denominator in
equation (14). Export price indices are not available, so common practice it to use domestic deflators
instead (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). In that case, the deflators in (14) cancel out and using nominal
or real variables yields the same values for θkij (which is the approach we have followed in the paper).
Since there are reasons to believe that domestic and export price indices diﬀer from each other, for
instance in the case of pricing-to-market practices, we need to tackle this empirical problem up-front.
One way of doing this is to include a set of time-varying sector (3-digit) fixed eﬀects, which leaves
our results unaﬀected (Column 5). A second way is to run cross-sectional regressions for each year, as
we do in Table A2. This approach comes at the cost of strongly reducing the number of observations for
each regression so that not all variables are significant in all years, but overall the results largely hold
up.41 It is interesting that the magnitude of the coeﬃcient on the non-Eurozone dummy substantially
increases between 2002 and 2003, suggesting that the negative eﬀect of not adopting the Euro might
have strengthened over time. There is also some evidence that the importance of TBTs increased in
the last three years. Finally, the coeﬃcients on distance remain stable.42
40 In the case of zero trade observations, we drop the entire series to keep a balanced sample over time. This results
in 16 fewer observations in Column (3) as the five zero trade observations correspond to four diﬀerent series only.
41Lagged productivity is omitted for 1999.
42The literature that examines the evolution of distance eﬀects over time yields mixed results. Coe, Subramanian
and Tamirisa (2007) find declining distance eﬀects once they estimate a non-linear version of the gravity equation with
an additive error term. In contrast, Berthelon and Freund (2008) find an increasing impact of distance as the eﬀect of
distance remains unchanged in 75 percent of their industries but increases in the remaining industries. For an overview,
see Disdier and Head (2008).
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In order to compare how θkij performs relative to alternative measures of trade integration, we use
the log inverse phi -ness of trade as a dependent variable in Column (6) of Table A1. This implicitly
assumes that the elasticity of substitution is equal to 1.5 for all industries so that the exponent in
equation (14) becomes unity. Assuming a homogeneous elasticity of substitution across industries
reduces the adjusted R2 considerably by about twelve percentage points to 0.693. Moreover, although
their signs remain mostly unchanged, the size of most estimated coeﬃcients is radically diﬀerent. In
addition, not being a member of the Eurozone, TBTs and sharing a common border are no longer
significantly associated with trade integration.43
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper explores the sources and size of trade impediments. Measuring these impediments directly
is often diﬃcult because of data limitations. Instead, we indirectly infer trade impediments from
observable trade flows. For this purpose we use the gravity framework pioneered by Anderson and
van Wincoop (2003) and apply it to industries with heterogeneous trade costs and heterogeneous
elasticities of substitution. The model yields a micro-founded measure of bilateral trade integration
that controls for time-varying multilateral resistance and that can be applied to disaggregated panel
data. We show that this trade integration measure is also consistent with the Ricardian model by
Eaton and Kortum (2002) and recent heterogeneous firms models.
From an empirical perspective, we use this micro-founded measure to explore the key determi-
nants of trade integration across countries and industries in the European Union. We show that
cross-country trade integration is lower for those countries in our sample that joined the EU most
recently and that opted out of the Euro common currency, but it is higher for countries that have
implemented the Schengen Agreement. We also document a considerable variation in trade integra-
tion across industries. Consistent with the literature on firm heterogeneity, we find that industries
with higher productivity trade more on international markets. Trade integration is hampered by
transportation costs as captured by industry-specific weight-to-value and c.i.f./f.o.b. ratios. Trade
integration is also severely hampered by policy factors, in particular Technical Barriers to Trade and
intransparent public procurement procedures. Our findings suggest for public policy that gains from
improved international trade integration are possible through the elimination of TBTs and through
more transparent advertising of public procurement contracts.
Moreover, we find that trade integration has improved on average between 1999 and 2003. We
find that roughly 58 percent of the growth in trade can be accounted for by improvements in trade
integration through a decrease in bilateral and multilateral trade barriers, while the rest can be
attributed to increases in manufacturing output.
To conclude, our measure yields sensible systematic diﬀerences in trade integration across in-
dustries, suggesting that modeling trade costs as a “one-fits-all” impediment is clearly at odds with
empirical evidence. Instead, when dealing with industry-level data it is important to allow for trade
cost heterogeneity across industries.
43We also tried using the elasticities from Broda and Weinstein (2006) for the US in computing θkij . However, this
led to large outliers in θkij and the overall results were weaker. The most likely reason is that those elasticities are much
more finely disaggregated and the classifications are thus harder to match. The results are available upon request.
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Ultimately, of course even highly disaggregated industry-level data “can never be as fine as reality,
so some degree of aggregation bias is inevitable” (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004, p.729). Thus,
the use of industry-level data precludes us from exploring the determinants and change in trade
impediments at the firm or product level. In our view, analyzing trade barriers at these very fine
levels of disaggregation is a natural and important next step.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Individual Industries
3-digit Nace rev.1 Industry θk min θk max θk σk wvk
Bricks 146.91 5.52 994.94 2.65 4.92
Cement, lime, plaster 109.88 23.21 480.73 2.52 13.36
Stone 54.67 8.29 552.31 2.65 2.14
Fruit, vegetables 41.58 6.11 387.65 2.46 1.03
Articles of concrete, plaster, cement 25.12 2.24 581.78 3.24 3.11
Ceramic tiles, flags 18.15 2.00 266.85 2.65 1.75
Sawmilling, planing of wood 14.75 2.33 106.51 3.36 2.28
Jewellery 14.00 1.95 72.17 3.48 0.01
Other food products 11.31 1.53 1,056.31 4.81 0.58
Wooden containers 10.27 2.46 87.53 3.99 2.14
Furniture 9.98 1.81 157.52 3.64 0.25
Ceramic goods 9.66 0.86 157.07 3.27 0.71
Prepared animal feeds 9.57 1.04 42.25 3.61 1.75
Glass 8.93 0.80 122.86 3.09 0.84
Builders’ carpentry, joinery 8.76 2.74 48.50 3.99 0.51
Processing of iron, steel 6.90 1.71 30.51 3.53 1.10
Publishing 6.66 1.02 78.18 4.88 0.17
Printing 6.39 1.60 21.38 5.58 0.29
Other non-metallic mineral products 5.88 1.23 34.85 2.96 0.57
Structural metal products 5.84 2.27 37.71 4.79 0.36
Other products of wood 5.57 1.79 19.47 4.13 0.38
Tanks, reservoirs 4.48 1.40 22.47 4.76 0.29
Tubes 4.30 1.73 21.12 3.53 0.94
Weapons, ammunition 4.09 2.35 8.80 4.88 0.13
Paper, paperboard 4.00 1.37 12.18 4.64 0.37
Leather clothes 4.00 2.97 5.20 5.66 0.02
Rubber products 3.90 0.80 10.21 3.88 0.26
Fish 3.73 1.35 12.61 4.71 0.33
Pulp, paper, paperboard 3.50 1.36 12.60 4.28 1.71
Other fabricated metal products 3.30 1.24 17.52 4.89 0.39
Wearing apparel 3.02 0.70 15.42 5.66 0.11
Plastic products 2.95 1.29 11.41 5.36 0.28
Miscellaneous manufacturing 2.81 1.41 8.01 4.99 0.13
Grain mill products 2.79 1.65 8.76 5.05 1.69
Musical instruments 2.75 1.47 5.09 4.88 0.05
Cutlery 2.65 1.17 7.08 4.85 0.10
Steam generators 2.59 1.60 6.08 7.87 0.20
Ships, boats 2.57 1.27 4.70 7.40 0.27
Dairy products 2.47 1.57 5.60 6.77 0.52
Luggage, handbags 2.45 1.41 4.20 6.18 0.07
(continued on next page)
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Table 1 (continued)
3-digit Nace rev.1 Industry θk min θk max θk σk wvk
Soap, detergents 2.30 1.43 10.55 5.74 0.60
Other transport equipment 2.30 1.39 5.05 7.11 0.27
Tobacco 2.29 2.02 2.54 6.62 0.26
Paints, varnishes 2.27 1.41 4.93 6.37 0.44
Basic chemicals 2.22 1.07 6.40 6.09 0.87
Knitted, crocheted articles 2.20 1.12 5.77 6.90 0.04
Electrical equipment 2.14 1.13 4.70 5.94 0.06
Lighting equipment 2.11 1.19 4.26 5.17 0.09
Railway locomotives 2.10 1.31 4.74 7.40 0.13
Insulated wire, cable 2.10 1.26 3.27 5.88 0.19
Knitted, crocheted fabrics 2.07 1.51 3.35 6.90 0.10
Other chemical products 2.04 1.00 6.01 6.46 0.30
Electricity distribution apparatus 2.01 1.33 2.80 5.88 0.04
Sports goods 2.00 0.68 3.79 4.88 0.12
Domestic appliances 1.94 1.04 4.05 5.75 0.18
Made-up textile articles 1.89 1.12 2.93 7.46 0.11
Man-made fibres 1.87 1.41 2.51 6.59 0.42
Footwear 1.86 1.12 3.25 7.22 0.04
Medical equipment 1.84 1.43 2.63 6.00 0.03
Other general purpose machinery 1.84 1.25 4.28 7.00 0.13
Agricultural, forestry machinery 1.83 1.19 3.03 8.36 0.17
Parts for motor vehicles 1.75 1.06 4.50 7.28 0.17
Electronic valves, tubes 1.74 1.04 2.84 5.88 0.02
Other textiles 1.68 0.96 3.13 7.82 0.17
Other special purpose machinery 1.66 1.09 3.25 8.17 0.08
Pesticides 1.66 1.22 2.40 6.75 0.28
Tanning, dressing of leather 1.62 1.14 3.35 8.92 0.08
Pharmaceuticals 1.62 1.11 3.39 9.05 0.05
Machinery 1.57 0.88 2.86 7.21 0.09
Electronic motors 1.56 1.24 2.06 7.02 0.09
Dressing, dyeing of fur 1.53 1.19 1.97 8.09 0.02
Motorcycles, bicycles 1.52 1.08 1.93 7.11 0.10
Optical instruments 1.52 1.21 2.10 7.70 0.01
Accumulators 1.48 1.12 1.87 5.88 0.32
Games, toys 1.41 1.11 1.72 4.88 0.10
Motor vehicles 1.40 1.21 1.61 7.25 0.12
Aircraft, spacecraft 1.37 1.21 1.60 7.55 0.00
Oﬃce machinery, computers 1.15 1.04 1.24 10.94 0.02
Notes: Authors’ calculations. For θk, σk and wvk, the numbers reported are averages for each
3-digit industry. wvk is in units of kg/Euro.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Individual Countries
θi min θi max θi
Ireland 9.47 1.208 261.49
Spain 9.02 0.677 1056.30
Denmark 8.80 1.138 782.81
Finland 8.61 1.195 552.31
Italy 7.75 0.701 1,056.30
United Kingdom 7.73 0.999 994.94
Austria 6.69 0.927 154.63
Portugal 6.50 0.677 414.15
Germany 5.67 0.879 480.73
Netherlands 5.48 0.970 123.36
France 5.28 0.701 414.15
Notes: Authors’ calculations. The numbers reported for θi are averages
for each country across industries.
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Table 3: The Determinants of EU Trade Integration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Geography/Transport Costs
lnDij 0.583
(28.378)
a 0.515
(23.296)
a 0.530
(24.799)
a 0.483
(21.420)
a 0.495
(22.074)
a 0.506
(22.806)
a
ln (Dii ×Djj) −0.930
(−11.973)
a −0.945
(−11.381)
a −0.990
(−12.247)
a −0.923
(−11.323)
a −0.928
(−11.672)
a −0.969
(−12.354)
a
Adjij −0.063
(−2.810)
a −0.051
(−2.218)
b −0.044
(−1.939)
c −0.068
(−2.917)
a −0.061
(−2.625)
a −0.055
(−2.428)
b
Langij −0.201
(−4.854)
a −0.355
(−8.109)
a −0.353
(−7.995)
a −0.363
(−8.186)
a −0.369
(−8.432)
a −0.368
(−8.331)
a
ln cfobkt 0.030
(5.464)
a 0.030
(6.152)
a 0.031
(6.294)
a 0.030
(6.146)
a 0.015
(3.291)
a 0.016
(3.400)
a
lnwvkt 0.719
(5.973)
a 0.631
(6.414)
a 0.642
(6.459)
a 0.648
(6.698)
a 0.664
(6.833)
a 0.673
(6.854)
a
Policy Variables
FI,ATij — 0.199
(11.215)
a 0.187
(10.666)
a 0.233
(12.376)
a 0.228
(12.331)
a 0.220
(11.851)
a
noEUROij,t — 0.042
(3.108)
a 0.032
(2.388)
b 0.040
(2.906)
a 0.036
(2.704)
a 0.027
(2.072)
b
Schengenij,t — −0.137
(−5.443)
a −0.118
(−4.774)
a −0.135
(−4.914)
a −0.132
(−4.954)
a −0.113
(−4.302)
a
lnTBT kij — 0.142
(2.822)
a — 0.146
(2.721)
a 0.131
(2.434)
b —
TBT k — — 0.057
(2.156)
b — — 0.056
(1.967)
b
lnProckij,t — −0.573
(−1.886)
c −0.528
(−1.738)
c −0.963
(−2.729)
a −0.917
(−2.564)
b −0.892
(−2.495)
b
lnV AT kij — −2.282
(−5.741)
a −2.290
(−5.744)
a −2.259
(−5.693)
a −1.910
(−5.122)
a −1.931
(−5.138)
a
Other Costs
lnProdkij,t−1 — — — −0.143
(−4.453)
a −0.144
(−4.581)
a −0.156
(−5.120)
a
Zeroskij,t — — — 2.277
(9.913)
a 2.210
(9.849)
a 2.193
(9.511)
a
Controls
KSkij,t — — — — 0.054
(1.465)
0.063
(1.637)
lnGoodsk — — — — −0.112
(−9.653)
a −0.112
(−9.633)
a
N 15,040 15,040 15,040 12,032 12,032 12,032
Adj-R2 0.791 0.802 0.801 0.804 0.810 0.810
Notes: The dependent variable is ln θkij,t. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the 4-digit Nace rev.1
level in each country pair (3,008 clusters). Year and 3-digit industry fixed eﬀects are included in all regressions. The
sample period is 1999-2003. t-statistics in parentheses. Constant terms are included but not reported. a, b and c indicate
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 4: Variance Decomposition
(1) (2)
Geography/Transport Costs 24.6% 25.0%
lnDij 5.4% 5.6%
ln (Dii ×Djj) 0.7% 0.8%
Adjij 0.6% 0.5%
Langij 0.5% 0.5%
ln cfobkt 0.7% 0.7%
lnwvkt 16.7% 16.9%
Policy Variables 7.6% 6.8%
FI,ATij 1.4% 1.4%
noEUROij,t 0.01% 0.01%
Schengenij,t 0.2% 0.2%
lnTBT kij 4.5% —
TBT k — 3.7%
lnProckij,t 0.6% 0.6%
lnV AT kij 0.8% 0.8%
Other Costs 0.3% 0.4%
lnProdkij,t−1 0.1% 0.1%
Zeroskij,t 0.3% 0.3%
Controls 5.6% 5.5%
KSkij,t 0.1% 0.1%
lnGoodsk 5.4% 5.4%
3-digit industry fixed eﬀects 42.8% 43.2%
Year fixed eﬀects 0.01% 0.01%
Variation explained 80.8% 80.8%
Residual 19.2% 19.2%
Sum 100% 100%
N 12,032 12,032
Notes: The variance decompositions are calculated according to Fields (2003). The contribution of each
explanatory variable xm to the total variance of θkij,t is given by cm = βmcov
?
xm, θkij,t
?
/var
?
θkij,t
?
where
βm is the partial regression coeﬃcient of θ
k
ij,t on the explanatory variable xm (holding all other explanatory
variables constant). The decompositions in Columns (1) and (2) correspond to regressions (5) and (6) in
Table 3. The contributions sum to 100 percent.
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Table 5: The Gravity Equation
“Naive” Gravity (1) (2) (3) (4)
lnDij −3.589
(−31.563)
a −3.741
(−46.554)
a −3.629
(−30.342)
a −3.757
(−45.862)
a
ln
?
yki ykj
?
1.226
(57.064)
a 1.525
(68.313)
a — —
ln yki — — 1.271
(30.217)
a 1.546
(43.766)
a
ln ykj — — 1.184
(30.617)
a 1.507
(53.293)
a
Distance coeﬃcients Same ∀k k-specific Same ∀k k-specific
Adj-R2 0.602 0.849 0.602 0.849
Micro-Founded Gravity (1) (2) (3) (4)
lnDij −4.514
(−34.104)
a −5.131
(−52.663)
a −4.541
(−32.669)
a −5.045
(−53.067)
a
ln (Dii ×Djj) 11.551
(19.551)
a 7.584
(17.071)
a — —
lnDii — — 2.022
(13.343)
a 1.113
(6.612)
a
lnDjj — — 2.223
(12.676)
a 1.659
(12.387)
a
ln
?
xkiixkjj
?
0.750
(31.486)
a 1.010
(41.879)
a — —
lnxkii — — 0.789
(16.522)
a 1.048
(27.501)
a
lnxkjj — — 0.712
(15.942)
a 0.967
(28.263)
a
Distance coeﬃcients Same ∀k k-specific Same ∀k k-specific
Adj-R2 0.510 0.842 0.510 0.852
Micro-Founded Gravity with FE (1) (2) (3) (4)
lnDij −4.204
(−66.739)
a −4.653
(−15.537)
a — —
ln
?
yki ykj
?
1.388
(39.887)
a 1.462
(40.914)
a — —
Distance coeﬃcients Same ∀k k-specific — —
Adj-R2 0.581 0.639 — —
Notes: The upper, middle and lower panels refer to the naive and the two micro-founded gravity equations,
estimated according to (17), (18) and (19) in the text. In Columns (1) and (3), the coeﬃcients on bilateral
and domestic distances are constrained to be the same across industries. In Columns (2) and (4), they are
allowed to vary across industries, in which case we report the average of the elasticities estimated across
industries. In all cases the number of observations is equal to 15,040. The sample period is 1999-2003.
Constant terms are included but not reported. t-statistics in parentheses. a, b and c indicate significance
at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 6: Decomposition of the Growth in Trade
Trade growth Factor (1) Factor (2) N
1999-2003, Contribution of Contribution of
average, in % output growth trade integration
Full sample 7.96 42% 58% 12,032
Geography/Transport Costs
†Long Dij 9.13 63% 37% 6,452
†Short Dij 6.78 21% 79% 5,580
Adjij = 0 7.65 47% 53% 9,300
Adjij = 1 8.91 28% 72% 2,732
†High cfobk1999 7.50 70% 30% 4,704
†Low cfobk1999 8.24 26% 74% 7,328
†High wvk1999 7.07 54% 46% 3,744
†Low wvk1999 8.36 37% 63% 8,288
Langij = 0 8.06 43% 57% 11,704
Langij = 1 4.83 24% 76% 328
Policy Variables
FI,ATij 9.06 36% 64% 3,432
Rest of sample 7.58 44% 56% 8,600
noEUROij (from 2002) 0.32 85% 15% 1,796
EUROij (from 2002) 9.98 21% 79% 4,132
Schengenij,t = 0 6.56 144% -44% 270
Schengenij,t = 0.5 6.89 79% 21% 3,455
Schengenij,t = 1 8.45 24% 76% 8,307
†High TBT kij 7.41 17% 83% 4,232
†Low TBT kij 8.25 55% 45% 7,800
†Low Procij,1999 7.10 24% 76% 5,812
†High Procij,1999 8.79 60% 40% 6,220
Productivity
†Low Prodkij,1999 6.88 76% 24% 5,848
†High Prodkij,1999 8.93 12% 88% 6,184
Notes: Decompositions are obtained according to equation (23) in the text. The numbers reported for trade growth and
for factors (1) and (2) are weighted averages of the individual observations for each country pair and industry where
the weights are the products of sectoral bilateral exports in the initial year 1999. † denotes that the sample is split at
the mean value of the variable in question in the initial year 1999. Mean values are equal to Dij = 1, 161 kilometers,
cfobk1999 = 4.43, wvk1999 = 1.41 kg/Euro, TBT kij = 3.65, Procij,1999 = 1.12 and Prodkij,1999 = 41, 060 Euros/employee.
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Figure 1: Trade frictions ln θt, 1999-2003, average across countries and industries.
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Figure 2: Annualized growth rates per industry, 1999-2003, see regression (20).
• indicates significance at the 10 percent level. × indicates insignificantly diﬀerent from zero.
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Appendix A
Table A1: The Determinants of EU Trade Integration — Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Geography/Transport Costs
lnDij 0.786
(7.221)
a — 0.492
(21.932)
a 0.465
(22.586)
a 0.495
(21.828)
a 3.785
(28.313)
a
ln (Dii ×Djj) −1.112
(−3.151)
a — −0.925
(−11.642)
a −0.873
(−11.970)
a −0.927
(−11.556)
a −7.779
(−16.284)
a
Adjij −0.449
(−3.629)
a — −0.063
(−2.704)
a −0.060
(−2.852)
a −0.061
(−2.603)
a −0.097
(−0.811)
Langij −0.159
(−1.145)
— −0.368
(−8.423)
a −0.357
(−8.612)
a −0.369
(−8.363)
a −2.590
(−11.979)
a
ln cfobkt 0.067
(3.223)
a 0.017
(3.596)
a 0.015
(3.174)
a 0.013
(3.106)
a 0.018
(2.615)
a 0.150
(5.350)
a
lnwvkt 0.606
(3.814)
a 0.670
(7.007)
a 0.665
(6.854)
a 0.648
(7.255)
a 0.724
(6.826)
a 1.961
(6.120)
a
Policy Variables
FI,ATij 0.406
(5.146)
a — 0.227
(12.253)
a 0.215
(12.390)
a 0.229
(12.212)
a 1.827
(16.812)
a
noEUROij,t 0.248
(3.212)
a — 0.034
(2.549)
b 0.032
(2.675)
a 0.037
(2.628)
a 0.077
(0.950)
Schengenij,t −0.449
(−3.265)
a — −0.130
(−4.928)
a −0.119
(−4.930)
a −0.134
(−4.937)
a −0.577
(−3.696)
a
lnTBT kij 1.110
(4.430)
a 0.105
(1.876)
c 0.133
(2.473)
b 0.127
(2.664)
a 0.125
(2.346)
b −0.057
(−0.430)
lnProckij,t −3.320
(−3.245)
a −1.377
(−3.789)
a −0.899
(−2.521)
b −0.779
(−2.409)
b −1.279
(−2.752)
a −5.717
(−1.967)
b
lnV ATkij −4.103
(−2.468)
b −2.520
(−5.573)
a −1.848
(−4.979)
a −1.502
(−4.279)
a −1.917
(−5.063)
a −13.274
(−5.579)
a
Other Costs
lnProdkij,t−1 −0.297
(−2.784)
a −0.109
(−2.615)
a −0.144
(−4.574)
a −0.134
(−4.501)
a −0.152
(−4.720)
a −1.638
(−9.872)
a
Zeroskij,t 2.145
(13.827)
a 2.249
(12.775)
a — 2.287
(9.872)
a 2.214
(9.853)
a 13.245
(11.914)
a
Controls
KSkij,t 0.318
(1.740)
c 0.042
(1.027)
0.054
(1.459)
0.055
(1.610)
0.055
(1.467)
0.280
(1.599)
lnGoodsk −0.181
(−4.381)
a −0.112
(−9.888)
a −0.110
(−9.487)
a −0.102
(−9.680)
a −0.111
(−9.465)
a −1.205
(−15.924)
a
Estimator PPML OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Fixed Eﬀects t,K t× ij,K t,K t,K t×K t,K
Weighted No No No Yes No No
Sample Full Full Excl. zeros Full Full Full
N 12,032 12,032 12,016 12,032 12,032 12,032
Adj-R2 — 0.821 0.810 0.812 0.812 0.693
Notes: In (1) the dependent variable is θkij,t and in (2) to (5) the dependent variable is ln θkij,t. In (6), the dependent
variable is the (log) inverse phi -ness of trade. Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimation in (1); fixed
eﬀects OLS regressions in (2) to (6). Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the 4-digit Nace rev.1 level
in each country pair (3,008 clusters). The sample period is 1999-2003. Weighted regression in (4) where the weights are
the product of sectoral bilateral exports in the initial year 1999. t-statistics in parentheses. Constant terms are included
but not reported. a, b and c indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table A2: The Determinants of EU Trade Integration: Cross-sectional samples
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Geography/Transport Costs
lnDij 0.515
(22.108)
a 0.475
(19.175)
a 0.515
(20.834)
a 0.493
(20.453)
a 0.498
(20.306)
a
ln (Dii ×Djj) −0.857
(−10.064)
a −0.955
(−10.932)
a −0.988
(−10.942)
a −0.906
(−11.068)
a −0.836
(−9.928)
a
Adjij −0.050
(−2.146)
b −0.068
(−2.860)
a −0.057
(−2.225)
b −0.054
(−2.183)
b −0.056
(−2.180)
b
Langij −0.351
(−7.436)
a −0.357
(−7.970)
a −0.376
(−8.145)
a −0.383
(−8.165)
a −0.377
(−7.701)
a
ln cfobkt 0.031
(2.109)
b 0.015
(1.347)
0.004
(0.301)
0.002
(0.204)
0.040
(3.292)
a
lnwvkt 0.793
(7.132)
a 0.928
(7.775)
a 0.743
(6.202)
a 0.733
(6.011)
a 0.541
(4.804)
a
Policy Variables
FI,ATij 0.179
(9.504)
a 0.219
(11.122)
a 0.224
(10.800)
a 0.237
(11.875)
a 0.246
(12.257)
a
noEUROij,t — — — 0.029
(1.353)
0.061
(2.690)
a
Schengenij,t −0.113
(−3.751)
a −0.123
(−4.136)
a −0.161
(−4.268)
a −0.150
(−3.361)
a −0.134
(−2.907)
a
lnTBT kij 0.098
(2.393)
b 0.059
(1.572)
0.125
(2.162)
b 0.142
(2.595)
a 0.170
(2.589)
a
lnProckij,t −0.113
(−0.128)
−0.728
(−1.342)
−1.243
(−1.925)
c −0.752
(−1.034)
−1.866
(−4.520)
a
lnV AT kij −1.817
(−4.604)
a −2.269
(−5.226)
a −1.847
(−4.778)
a −1.407
(−3.461)
a −2.154
(−4.503)
a
Other Costs
lnProdkij,t−1 — −0.198
(−5.622)
a −0.144
(−4.102)
a −0.108
(−3.008)
a −0.163
(−4.249)
a
Zeroskij,t — — — 2.239
(7.733)
a 2.205
(11.095)
a
Controls
KSkij,t −0.060
(−1.269)
−0.044
(−1.005)
0.076
(1.744)
c 0.083
(1.827)
c 0.137
(2.412)
b
lnGoodsk −0.096
(−7.040)
a −0.114
(−8.656)
a −0.121
(−9.038)
a −0.111
(−9.161)
a −0.098
(−7.577)
a
N 3,008 3,008 3,008 3,008 3,008
Adj-R2 0.818 0.814 0.811 0.817 0.813
Notes: The dependent variable is ln θkij,t. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the 4-digit
Nace rev.1 level in each country pair (3,008 clusters). 3-digit industry fixed eﬀects are included in all
regressions. The sample period is 1999-2003. t-statistics in parentheses. Constant terms are included but
not reported. a, b and c indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Appendix B: Technical Appendix
As discussed in Section 2.4, our approach is consistent with a number of leading trade theories. This appendix
provides the details. For simplicity we drop the industry index k so that we can write the trade integration
measure in equation (14) as
θij =
µ
xiixjj
xijxji
¶ 1
2(σ−1)
=
µ
tijtji
tiitjj
¶ 1
2
(24)
We use the notation from our model when referring to expressions from the papers below.
Eaton and Kortum (2002) In the Ricardian model by Eaton and Kortum (2002), productivity in each
country is drawn from a Fréchet distribution that has two parameters, Ti and ζ. Ti determines the location of
the productivity distribution for country i, with a high Ti denoting high overall productivity. ζ > 1 denotes
the variation of productivity across goods and is treated as common across countries, with a high ζ denoting
little variation. Costinot and Komunjer (2007) generalize the model to multiple industries. The model yields a
gravity equation for an aggregate of homogeneous goods whose structure is similar to equation (7). It is given
by
xij
xj
=
Ti (citij)
−ζPJ
i=1 Ti (citij)
−ζ
where ci denotes the input cost in country i. We are interested in the trade cost parameters. Ti and ci are
unobservable but cancel out once the ratio of domestic over bilateral trade flows is formed as in equation (24).
This yields
θEKij =
µ
xiixjj
xijxji
¶ 1
2ζ
=
µ
tijtji
tiitjj
¶ 1
2
(25)
Comparing equations (24) and (25), it is obvious that θEKij = θij if ζ = σ−1. For more details on the comparison
of Armington-type and Ricardian models, see Eaton and Kortum (2002, footnote 20) and Anderson and van
Wincoop (2004, pp. 709-710).
Chaney (2008) Chaney (2008) builds on the seminal paper by Melitz (2003) and derives a gravity equation
based on a model with heterogeneous productivity across firms and fixed costs of exporting. In contrast to
standard trade models, the two assumptions of heterogeneous firms and fixed costs of exporting introduce
an extensive margin of trade. Exporters do not only vary the size of shipments in response to trade cost
changes (the intensive margin), but the set of exporters also changes (the extensive margin). Chaney derives
the following industry-level gravity equation
xij = μ
yiyj
y
µ
witij
λj
¶−γ
(fij)
−( γσ−1−1)
where μ is the weight of the industry in the consumers’ utility function, yi is total income of country i, y is world
income, wi is workers’ productivity in country i, λj is a remoteness variable akin to multilateral resistance and
fij are the fixed costs of exporting from country i to j. γ is the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution,
with a high γ denoting a low degree of heterogeneity and γ > σ−1. Forming the ratio of domestic over bilateral
trade flows yields
θChij =
µ
xiixjj
xijxji
¶ 1
2γ
=
µ
tijtji
tiitjj
¶ 1
2
µ
fijfji
fiifjj
¶ 1
2(
1
σ−1−
1
γ )
(26)
The trade integration measure θChij is a function of both variable and fixed trade costs. For details on welfare
implications of the above models, see Arkolakis, Demidova, Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (2008).
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) also model heterogeneous firms. But in contrast
to Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008), firms face fixed costs of market entry fE that can be interpreted as product
development and production start-up costs. When exporting, the firms only face variable trade costs and no
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fixed costs of exporting. The model is based on non-CES preferences that give rise to endogenous markups.
More specifically, markups tend to be low in large markets with many competitors. Their multiple country
model leads to the following gravity equation
xij =
1
2δ(γ + 2)
N iEψ
iLj
³
cjd
´γ+2
(tij)
−γ
where δ is a parameter from the utility function that indicates the degree of product diﬀerentiation (a higher
δ means a higher degree of diﬀerentiation). N iE is the number of entrants in country i. ψ
i is an index of
comparative advantage in technology. A high ψi means that entrants in country i have a high chance of
obtaining good productivity draws. Lj denotes the number of consumers in country j. cjd is the marginal cost
cut-oﬀ above which domestic firms in country j do not produce. The intuition is that tougher competition in
country j, reflected by a lower cjd, makes it harder for exporters from i to break into that market. Forming the
ratio of domestic over bilateral trade flows yields
θMOij =
µ
xiixjj
xijxji
¶ 1
2γ
=
µ
tijtji
tiitjj
¶ 1
2
(27)
Fixed costs do not enter the trade integration measure θMOij because all firms face identical entry costs fE and
no fixed costs of exporting. Variable trade costs are suﬃcient to induce selection into export markets because
of bounded non-CES marginal utility.
Summary The four measures θij , θEKij , θ
Ch
ij and θ
MO
ij have in common that they scale the ratio of domestic over
bilateral trade flows by parameters that indicate a particular form of heterogeneity. A low σ in equation (24)
indicates a high degree of diﬀerentiation across products; a low ζ in equation (25) indicates a high variation of
productivity across countries; and a low γ in equations (26) and (27) indicates a high degree of firm heterogeneity.
For given trade flows, higher heterogeneity in equations (24)-(27) implies higher trade frictions. Intuitively,
suppose we observe two industries with the same ratio of domestic over bilateral trade but one industry is
characterized by a higher degree of heterogeneity. With higher heterogeneity countries produce goods that are
more diﬀerent from each other or reflect larger diﬀerences in comparative advantage. Thus, consumers have
a larger incentive to trade. The fact that consumers do not trade more implies that trade frictions must be
higher in that industry.
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Appendix C: Data Appendix
Trade data, weight-to-value and c.i.f./f.o.b. Bilateral and total export and import trade flows (thousand
Euros), and their corresponding weight (tons) are used for 11 EU countries between 1999 and 2003 at the 4-digit
Nace rev.1 level of manufacturing industries. Source: Eurostat.
In Section 4.1, the bilateral weight-to-value ratio of exports (kilograms per Euro exported) is calculated sepa-
rately for the two partners in each industry and in each year, and is then averaged across all partners. In Section
4.3, the bilateral weight-to-value ratio of exports is calculated for each country, industry and year. In both
cases, we calculate the log of one plus weight-to-value as weight-to-value often takes on values much smaller
than one.
The ratio between bilateral import (“Costs, Insurance and Freight,” c.i.f.) and export (“Free On Board,” f.o.b.)
flows is calculated separately for the two partners in each industry and in each year, and is then averaged across
all partners, dropping the few cases where the ratio is smaller than one. We then use the log of the ratio.
Output Gross value of output (million Euros) at the 4-digit Nace rev.1 level. Source: Eurostat’s New Cronos
database.
Elasticities of Substitution We draw on estimates by Hummels (2001a) who uses data on bilateral trade
flows, import tariﬀs and transport costs to estimate elasticities of substitution at the 2-digit SITC rev.3 level of
industries. We use his OLS estimates (he also reports IV estimates which yield higher values for the elasticities).
The elasticities are converted using tables of correspondence from the SITC rev.3 to the ISIC rev.3, and then
from the ISIC rev.3 to the Nace rev.1. In the few cases where the Nace rev.1 level industries have to be matched
with several SITC industries, we calculate the average across SITC industries. Ideally, one would compute a
weighted average where the weights are given by the share of each SITC rev.3 industry into each Nace rev.1
industry grouping, but this information is not available. Among the 62 elasticities, 4 are not significantly
diﬀerent from zero so we set them to missing. Source: Hummels (2001a).
Gravity Variables Dummies for sharing a common land border and for sharing a common (oﬃcial) language.
Source: Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII). International and domestic
distances, which are weighted averages of the distances between regions using GDP shares as weights. Source:
Chen (2004).
Schengen Agreement For each country, a dummy is equal to one in the years in which the provisions of the
Schengen Agreement are fully implemented. We then take the average between the two partners. The resulting
variable takes on values of zero, one half and one. The years of first implementation are chosen depending
on the month in which the Agreement went into force: Austria (1998-2004), Denmark (2001-2004), Finland
(2001-2004), France (1995-2004), Germany (1995-2004), Italy (1998-2004), Netherlands (1995-2004), Portugal
(1995-2004), Spain (1995-2004) while Ireland and the United Kingdom have not yet fully implemented the
Agreement.
Technical Barriers to Trade We use two sources. The European Commission’s Eurobarometer reports opin-
ions and experiences of European managers about the Single Market. A total of 4,900 managers at companies
were interviewed by telephone in early 2006, the sample of companies being selected according to the size of
countries and of companies, and the industry of activity. We use the answer to the question: “Could you tell me
whether you consider that for your company it is very important, rather important, rather unimportant or not
important at all that future Single Market Policy tackles the question of removing remaining technical barriers
to trade in goods?” For each country, we group the answers from all managers who replied that TBTs are
indeed an important issue, and use the percentage so obtained as a country-specific indication on the relevance
of TBTs. Source: European Commission (2006).
To capture the sectoral relevance of TBTs, industries are classified on a five-point scale according to the
eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent measures undertaken by the Single Market Programme to eliminate TBTs: measures
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are successful and all significant barriers are removed (value of 1), measures are implemented and function well
but some barriers remain (value of 2), measures are adopted but with implementation or transitional problems
still to be overcome (value of 3), measures are proposed or implemented but not eﬀective or with operating
problems (value of 4), and no solution has been adopted (value of 5). Some industries are also identified as
being not aﬀected by TBTs prior to European integration (and are given a value of 0). Our industry-specific
qualitative variable takes on values between 0 and 5, with larger values indicating a lack of market integration
due to persisting TBTs. Source: European Commission (1998).
We then interact the log of one plus the average across partners of the share of managers replying that TBTs
are important with one plus the industry-specific variable on TBTs.
Public Procurement We use two sources. For each country, we use the proportion of public procurement
contracts advertised each year in the Oﬃcial Journal of the EU. Source: Eurostat. The industries strongly
aﬀected by public procurement in Europe are identified at the Nace 70 level, are then converted at the Nace
rev.1 level and identified by a dummy variable. Source: Davies and Lyons (1996). We calculate the log of one
plus the average across partners of the proportion of public procurement contracts advertised in the Oﬃcial
Journal of the EU, which we then interact with the sectoral dummy.
Value-Added Taxes For each country, we use the standard VAT rate and replace it by the reduced VAT
rates that apply to some categories of goods, as of January 1st, 2008. We do not have information on the
evolution of reduced VAT rates across goods over time, but we do not expect those to have changed much as
the standard VAT rates changed very little during the time period we consider. We then compute the log of one
plus the average across partners of the VAT rates that apply in each country and industry. Source: European
Commission (2008).
Productivity Real labor productivity is value added divided by the number of employees at the 4-digit
Nace Rev.1 level, deflated by GDP deflators. We then use the log of the average across partners of real labor
productivity. Source: Eurostat’s New Cronos database.
Capital Shares Capital shares are value added minus personnel costs, divided by personnel costs. We then
calculate the log of one plus the absolute diﬀerence in capital shares between countries for each industry and
in each year. Source: Eurostat’s New Cronos database.
Number of Product Categories Source: Eurostat’s Prodcoms.
GDP Deflators Value of GDP (million Euros) and volume of GDP (millions of 1995 constant Euros). The
deflator is computed as the ratio between the value and the volume of GDP. Source: Eurostat’s New Cronos
database.
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